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Recent Nigerian experience illustrates the importance of
ensuring that the institutional, financial, and operational powers
of election management bodies are safeguarded
How should countries organise their systems of electoral administration? Recent election cycles in Nigeria
illustrate the importance of ensuring that electoral management bodies are not just institutionally independent, but
that steps are also taken to ensure that sufficient emphasis is placed on the institutional, financial, and operational
powers and functions of these organisations, argues Ibrahim Sani. 
Left: Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan (Credit: Blog do Planalto, CC BY ND 2.0)
Elections are complex political processes, requiring impartial electoral management bodies (EMBs). Democracies
around the world encounter various challenges of electoral quality. There is the abuse of postal voting in the 2004
Birmingham local elections, voters’ frustration in the 2010 UK general elections and the contentious vote recount
of the US 2000 presidential elections. Also, there was the use of bloated voter register in 1992 Ghanaian election
as the 2007 April elections in Nigeria. This questions the assumption that permanent and professional EMBs will
conduct credible elections. Moreover, electoral umpires have existed, but were not allowed to perform effectively
and achieve democratic visions, making it imperative to inspect the bureaucratic fundamentals of EMBs. The
purpose is to clarify the potential effects of institutional independence of EMBs in guaranteeing electoral credibility.
One way to illustrate this is by focusing on the constitutional authority provided to the electoral commissions.
Whilst constitutionally institutionalised, the powers of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in
Nigeria appear constrained in many ways. Table I below indicates the President as the most influential person in
the appointment of all 12 federal electoral commissioners (FECs), 37 residential electoral commissioners (RECs)
and the chief electoral commissioners. Although the President is to consult the Council of State (CoS) and seek
legislative approval, he alone appoints all the RECs who are the strategic field-agents of the commission at the 36
federating units, plus the capital. In addition, he is at liberty to appoint party loyalists and has the commission
within his reach. After all, agencies listed here are answerable and receive their funds from an executive
disbursement.
 Table 1: Comparative Autonomy of INEC Nigeria in 2007 & 2011 elections
These arrangements affect the commission’s institutional autonomy and its credibility in the conduct of the 2007
elections. For example, it is seen as the most significant institutional problem facing INEC which the country failed
to rectify during the 2006 Amendment Act. People feared that individuals appointed by the President could dance
to his tunes and do his biddings. Experiences before, during, and after the elections seem to confirm this fear as
there were reported cases of electoral frauds, irregularities, shortage of electoral materials, ballot box stuffing, an
announcement of fake and unaccounted election results, and an alleged revelation of how politicians do conspire
with electoral officials to create electoral windfall.
Consequently, the legitimacy of the elections was doubted to the extent that the 2007 elections were adjudged the
worst  in Nigeria’s post-independence electoral history. Indeed, the beneficiary of the elections acknowledged its
shortcomings, as did majority of Nigerians. A blogger described the elections as a reflection of near-total
dominance of the PDP and pervasive influence of the outgoing president– a position acknowledged by INEC when
it blamed the central bank and due process office for much of the 2007 electoral failures.
However, in the build-up to the 2011 elections certain amendments (indicated in green Tab. I) like subjecting the
appointment of RECs to legislature scrutiny raise the impartiality of the commission. Also, the removal of party
membership as requirement for appointment has enhanced its non-partisanship. For example, it is believed that
INEC in the 2011 elections has expanded and improved the political environment for better participation and
competition. It has elevated electoral fairness by providing fair grounds for democratic engagement. The 2011
elections have conformed to democratic values expressed by the African Union and ECOWAS.
Other significant variables toward these successes are the financial and administrative powers which the
commission enjoyed. It is reported that INEC independently designed and executed the elections, facing all the
challenges squarely. Election observers – domestic and foreign – commended the commission’s preparedness,
applauded the systematic deployment of electoral officials, and uphold the 2011 elections. For example, INEC
procured 232, 000 DDC machines, cameras, and printers and had them delivered as early as 29th November
2010; recruited and trained 368, 812 NYSC as presiding officers; purchased 9000 units of 6.5 KVA generating
sets as standby in case of battery failures and 150, 000 collapsible ballot boxes and made operational and
functional during the presidential, gubernatorial and other elections 119, 973 polling units, using enough and
qualified hands.
In conclusion, as Nigeria is approaching yet another round of general elections, there is the need for the
legislative houses to place more emphasis in ensuring that the commissions’ institutional, financial, and
operational powers and functions are protected in order to safeguard the sanctity of the ballot. To other countries,
this piece points that whatever model of EMBs in operation, there is the need for policy practitioners and public
activists to ensure that all is done towards a hitch-free elections.
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